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1. Introduction  
Climate risks, such as drought, flood, typhoon, and increased variability in 
weather conditions between seasons, threaten many rural households’ livelihoods in 
developing countries and are widely expected to grow more frequent with climate 
change. Access to formal insurance services may help build resilience to such risk and 
protect households’ longer-run welfare in the event of climate shocks by providing 
compensation for income and asset losses. Formal insurance, however, has remained 
underdeveloped in most poor, rural regions due to classic incentive problems associated 
with asymmetric information, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, as well as the 
high transaction costs involved in preventing opportunistic behavior by insurees. 
Available self-insurance options to smooth consumption, including ex ante risk 
mitigation toward more stable but lower return activities and ex post risk coping by 
selling productive assets in the face of downside shocks, are often costly, jeopardizing 
long-term household welfare (Morduch, 1995; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993). Given 
limited and inadequate self-insurance options, vulnerable rural households have 
developed mutual assistance mechanisms within their communities, which can partly, 
albeit not fully, help recover from losses due to idiosyncratic shocks (Dercon & 
Krishnan, 2000; Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994). It is, however, well known that such 
informal risk sharing mechanisms do not function effectively under covariate, 
catastrophic natural disasters, where all neighboring community members suffer 
substantial losses (Barrett, 2011). Protecting the rural poor from such covariate climate 
risks has been a major challenge to achieving sustainable rural poverty reduction.  
As a result, microinsurance – small-scale insurance products aimed at low 
income people who are generally excluded from more traditional insurance markets – 
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has attracted widespread interest as a means to enhancing the resilience of the rural poor 
against covariate climate risks (Churchill, 2006; de Bock & Gelade, 2012; Mechler, 
Linnerooth-Bayer, & Peppiatt, 2006). In particular, recently introduced index-based 
weather insurance has elicited considerable attention, especially since it is free from 
information asymmetry problems (Barnett, Barrett, & Skees, 2008). Index insurance 
indemnity payouts are determined based not on actual losses experienced by policy 
holders, but on easily observable, objective weather or environmental parameters—such 
as rainfall, temperature, or remotely sensed estimates of vegetation levels—that are 
highly correlated with losses. This allows insurers to avoid both the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems associated with indemnification of losses specific to the 
insured as well as the significant transaction costs associated with monitoring the 
behavior and verifying the losses of the insured. While basis risk (i.e., the discrepancy 
between realized loss and indemnity payouts predicted by the index) remains a potential 
threat to policy holders (Jensen, Mude, & Barrett, 2014a, 2014b), index products offer 
at least partial insurance against otherwise-uninsured climate risks. Index-based weather 
insurance has therefore excited considerable interest as a prospective remedy for 
hitherto-unmet demand for mitigating covariate weather risks in rural areas of 
developing countries.  
Despite sweeping claims that index-based microinsurance would be the next 
“revolution” in development practice (Morduch, 2006), the empirical evidence to date 
shows that unexpectedly low uptake, rarely above 30 percent of the intended population, 
causing many to rethink the attractiveness of the product or to suggest ways to improve it 
(de Bock & Gelade, 2012; Matul, Dalal, de Bock, & Gelade, 2013; Miranda & Farrin 
2012). For example, Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) argued that higher income farmers are 
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already self-insuring against risk by diversifying their income portfolio, while lower 
income farmers and landless laborers who are more likely to gain from index-based 
insurance cannot afford it. Breustedt, Bokusheva, & Heidelbac (2008) claimed that 
index-based insurance schemes did not provide statistically significant risk reduction for 
wheat farmers in Kazakhstan, which lowered product uptake. Leblois, Quirion, 
Alhassane, & Traoré (2014) modelled the ex ante expected utility benefits risk averse 
millet farmers in India might enjoy from purchasing index insurance and found minimal 
gains from insurance uptake, especially relative to the costs. Price and liquidity 
constraints are often identified as important factors suppressing demand (Cole et al., 
2013; Gine, Townsend, & Vickery, 2008; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, & Udry, 2014). 
McIntosh, Sarris, & Papadopoulos (2013) found high uptake among households 
randomly allocated vouchers that reduced the cost of the product. Also, sufficient 
knowledge of the somewhat esoteric product, especially where no other insurance 
products are sold, may hold back potential policy holders (Skees 2008) and, conversely, 
better knowledge of the product increases observed uptake (Cai, de Janvry, & Sadoulet, 
2013; Cai & Song, 2013; Gaurav, Cole, & Tobacman, 2011). 
Most existing studies are rooted in the experience of crop insurance programs 
that insure against income loss from yield fluctuations and do not focus on the small 
number of index-based asset insurance, such as livestock insurance, programs that have 
emerged in the recent past (Chantarat, Mude, Barrett, & Carter, 2013; Janzen & Carter, 
2013; McPeak. Chantarat, & Mude, 2010). To the extent that the livelihood systems, risk 
mitigation strategies, and the long term welfare outcomes associated with shocks differ 
between crop-based and pastoral-based production systems, we would expect the demand 
for and benefits of index-based insurance to similarly diverge. For example, where 
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households derive their income primarily from crops, durable household assets will likely 
serve as the household’s main store of wealth. While those assets may be drawn down in 
times of low income, the opportunity to recover crop income levels in subsequent periods 
is typically unaffected by a temporary shock like a drought. By contrast, households that 
derive their income primarily from livestock can suffer a permanent loss of expected 
income from a temporary shock (Chantarat et al., 2013; McPeak 2004). We might 
therefore expect demand for index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) to exceed that for 
index-based crop insurance.  
Analysis of demand for IBLI is just now emerging from products piloted in 
northern Kenya (Jensen et al., 2014a, 2014b), Ethiopia (Bageant, 2014), and Mongolia 
(Mahul & Skees, 2007). This paper adds to this growing literature using the experience 
of a new IBLI product introduced in pastoral southern Ethiopia in 2012. We use two 
waves of panel data, a baseline and a follow-up round between which respondent 
households had two (semi-annual) opportunities to purchase an IBLI policy. The IBLI 
product under investigation insures pastoralists against livestock mortality that often 
follows from catastrophic drought. Because severe forage scarcity is common during 
drought, IBLI is paired with satellite data that tracks local forage conditions, which are 
strongly correlated with area-average livestock losses. When those conditions become 
sufficiently adverse, it triggers indemnity payments. Over the course of each IBLI sales 
period, we introduced two kinds of randomized encouragement designs aimed at 
improving pastoralists’ understandings of IBLI (via “learning kits” featuring comics and 
audio tapes of skits made by local performers) and their ability to pay (via discount 
coupons). These experimental interventions were intended both to create incentives for 
IBLI uptake and to provide credible exogenous variation to identify demand patterns.  
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Our data reveal that uptake rate of IBLI approaches 30 percent in the initial 
year of product offer, exceeding that of most other index-based insurance products in 
their pilot periods. Estimation results indicate that the reduced price of the insurance 
through the provision of discount coupons significantly increases the uptake of IBLI. 
While there is a potential threat that a one-time price reduction serves as a price 
reference, which decreases demand in subsequent periods (Dupas, 2014; Fischer, 
McConnell, Karlan, & Raffler, 2014), we find no evidence of such anchor effects. On 
the other hand, while the learning kits do boost accurate knowledge of the product, 
better knowledge does not appear to increase uptake of IBLI.  
   The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the 
study site, sampling framework, and detailed designs of the IBLI product and 
quasi-experiments. Section 3 discusses descriptive statistics. Section 4 explains our 
estimation strategy, followed by discussion of estimation results in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Data 
2.1. Study area  
Our study area is located on the Borana plateau in Oromia regional state1 of 
southern Ethiopia (Figure 1). Most of the population is pastoralist, whose livelihoods 
depend primarily on livestock. The region is comprised of arid and semi-arid ecological 
zones with four seasons: a long rainy season (March to May); a long dry season (June to 
September); a short rainy season (October to November); and a short dry season 
                                                 
1 The largest Ethiopian administrative unit is the regional state, which is subdivided 
into zones, then into woredas, and further into kebeles, and finally into reeras.  
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(December to February). Herd migration in search of forage and water during the two 
dry seasons is common among pastoralists in this area.  
==Figure 1. here == 
The sustainability of pastoralism as a livelihood in Borena has been, however, 
significantly undermined due to recurrent drought, violent conflicts, and other political 
and economic instability (Desta, Berhanu, Gebru, & Amosha, 2008; Tache, 2008). 
Among these, drought is by far the greatest cause of livestock mortality in our study 
area (Barrett & Santos, 2014; Lybbert, Barrett, Desta, & Coppock, 2004). Major 
droughts occurred almost every six or seven years between the mid-1970s and 2012 (i.e., 
1973/74, 1983/84, 1991/92, 1999/00, 2005/06, and 2011/12), each causing massive 
numbers of livestock deaths (Desta et al., 2008; Megeresa, Markemann, Angassa, & 
Zárate, 2013). There exists a range of customary insurance arrangements, like debare 
and busa gonofa, that provide informal inter-household transfers in the form of cash or 
livestock. Yet many times the livelihoods of the entire community are threatened during 
drought, rendering traditional risk sharing arrangements weak and insufficient. 
Moreover these informal arrangements tend to cover only a small portion of household 
losses, usually exclude the persistently poor who need it the most, and are generally 
perceived to be in decline (Huysentruyt, Barrett, & McPeak, 2009; Lybbert et al., 2004; 
Santos & Barrett, 2011). In this setting, the demand for insurance that protects the 
pastoral population against drought-induced livestock losses should, therefore, be 
relatively substantial.  
 
2.2. Design of IBLI  
To help pastoralists manage the considerable drought-related mortality risk, 
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IBLI was introduced by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and 
Cornell University in collaboration with the Oromia Insurance Company (OIC) in 
August 2012. The basic product design is similar to a previously designed IBLI product 
in northern Kenya that was rolled out in January 2010. As in northern Kenya, the 
standardized Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index (NDVI), a numerical indicator 
of the degree of greenness based on remotely sensed data collected by satellites, 
accumulated over one rainy season and the following dry season was used to construct 
an index (Chantarat et al., 2012; Mude et al., 2012). This index was calibrated for high 
correlation with average livestock mortality from drought at the woreda level. 
Indemnity payouts are triggered when the index falls below the 15th percentile of the 
historical index distribution from 1981-2012. 
==Figure 2. here == 
IBLI is marketed and sold during two periods per year, directly preceding each 
rainy season (August-September and January-February), with coverage lasting one year 
and the potential for two indemnity payouts, one after each dry season (Figure 2). 
During each sales period, a household decides whether to buy IBLI and, if so, how 
many animals to insure. A premium payment is equal to the calculated total insured herd 
value (TIHV)2 multiplied by a woreda specific insurance premium rate given spatial 
differences in expected mortality risk.3 More precisely,  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (# of camel insured) ∗ 15,000 +  (# of cows insured) ∗ 5,000 +
                                                 
2 These nominal values are constant across sales periods.  
3 More specifically, woreda specific premium rates, which are close to actuarially fair 
premium rates, are as follows: 9.75 percent for Dilo, 8.71 percent for Teltele, 7.54 
percent for Yabello, 9.49 percent for Dire, 8.58 percent for Arero, 9.36 percent for Dhas, 
and 11.05 percent for Miyo and Moyale.  
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 (# of goats and sheep insured) ∗ 700  
and  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝 = Woreda specific insurance premium rates ∗  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇. 
If a household buys IBLI in the August-September sales period, it is insured 
from October 1 to September 30 of the following year and may receive indemnity 
payouts in March and/or October of the year following purchase. Note that if a pastoral 
household buys IBLI not only in the August-September sales period but also the 
following January-February sales period, then insurance coverage periods for the two 
contracts overlap from March to September, and the household may receive indemnity 
payouts for both contracts in October. This seasonally-overlapping design allows 
households to insure the same number of livestock but pay less on more frequent 
intervals and is, therefore, expected to reduce the cash constraints faced by pastoralists. 
The feature of two potential payouts in a year and the 15th percentile trigger 
level make an expected probability of payout occurring once every three and a half 
years. The indemnity payouts, if triggered, will be equal to the premium payment at a 
minimum and to half of TIHV at a maximum, depending on the realized NDVI. Within 
the period of data we study in this paper, two sales periods occurred, the first in 
August-September 2012 and the second in January-February 2013, and no indemnity 
payouts were made to insured households.  
 
2.3. Sampling framework 
While IBLI was marketed and sold to any household on the Borana plateau, we 
study a random sample of households in the region to explore the pattern of IBLI uptake 
among pastoralists. The baseline survey data were collected in March-April 2012 before 
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the first IBLI sales period (August-September 2012) was announced, with a follow-up 
survey implemented in April 2013 directly after the second IBLI sales period 
(January-February 2013). Sampling for the household survey is clustered at the reera 
level, the smallest administrative unit after kebele. Sample reeras (hereafter, called 
study sites) were selected so as to maximize agro-ecological and livelihood variation 
across the Boran pastoral area. Reeras inaccessible by vehicle were, however, excluded 
for logistical and cost reasons. As shown in Figure 1, 17 study sites were selected and, 
within these, development agents (DAs) who worked in the survey areas as local 
development officers completed a population and livestock holding census. Households 
in the census were then split into wealth terciles based on the number of livestock held. 
Then, 15 percent of households per study site were selected for the sample, one third 
from each of the livestock holding terciles, totaling 528 households across the 17 study 
sites. Due to logistical challenges in the March-May rainy season, however, baseline 
data were collected from only 515 of the selected sample in March 2012. This study 
draws on information from the 474 households that constitute a balanced panel 
(resurveyed in April 2013) and contain complete data sets in both captured sales 
periods.4  
 
2.4. Encouragement design 
To stimulate uptake of IBLI and construct a quasi-experimental research design, 
                                                 
4 The basic characteristics of those remain in and drop out from our sample are quite 
similar. Also, we have re-estimated models, such as those reported in Table 6, and found 
that the inverse mills ratio constructed from the first-stage selection model, whose 
dependent variable takes one if the household remains in the sample, is statistically 
insignificant, indicating that the sample attrition may not be problematic. For ease of 
discussion, we do not include the selection-correction term in our main regressions. 
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three different encouragement tactics were offered to randomly selected subpopulations 
during each of the two sales periods. The first component of the encouragement design 
intended to increase overall awareness of IBLI and to improve knowledge of how the 
product worked and its benefits. This was done through the use of two tools referred to 
as a “learning kit” – a comic and an audio tape of a skit – which were distributed 
randomly to households within randomly selected study sites through separate processes 
in each sales period. Study sites were stratified into three categories, i.e., those located 
closer to major livestock markets, those with sparse rainfall, and those located far from 
functioning livestock markets and within which households generally hold larger herds. 
Within each of these three strata, sites were randomly assigned comic and skit tape 
treatments, keeping at least one site as a control (no learning kit). Half of the households 
in each treatment site received the relevant learning kit and half did not.   
The second component of the encouragement design was the distribution of 
discount coupons which lowered the cost of purchasing IBLI. With a coupon, the 
recipient could purchase IBLI at a discounted rate for the first 15 Tropical Livestock 
Units (TLUs)5 insured. In each study site and each sales period, households offered 
discount coupons were randomly chosen to receive coupons ranging from 10-80 percent 
in order to manufacture exogenous variation in the effective price faced by prospective 
IBLI purchasers. Twenty percent of the sample households did not receive a coupon 
during each sales period and in total 4.6 percent of the sample households did not 
receive a coupon during the both periods.6  
                                                 
5 1 TLU is equivalent to 1 cow, 0.7 camel, 10 goat, or 10 sheep. 
6 Discount coupons were printed in 10 percent intervals between 10 percent and 80 
percent with roughly one tenth of the sampled households falling into each interval. In 
parallel with the household survey for this study, a separate but overlapping herd 
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To implement these experiments, DAs were trained to explain and distribute 
the coupons to the study households either in collective meetings or, less often, in 
separate personal visits. For the comic, DAs read and gave a paper version of the comic 
to treatment recipients, again either in community meetings or individually. Similarly, 
the DAs convened group meetings or met households at their home to play the audio 
tape of the skit describing IBLI. Unfortunately, ILRI staff found that some DAs did not 
implement these random assignments rigorously in the first sales period, especially for 
the cartoon and skit tape. Consultants were hired to implement these activities in the 
second sales period together with DAs to improve the quality of implementation. As a 
result, we use an intent-to-treat estimation strategy that will necessarily suffer some 
attenuation bias due to imperfect compliance.  
  
3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents selected descriptive statistics derived from the baseline data 
collected in early 2012 for the full sample then separately for those households that did 
and did not purchase IBLI. We refer to the overall sample below to describe the general 
characteristics of households in our study, except for those several variables that are 
statistically significantly different between these two sets of households.  
==Table 1. here == 
The average household size is 6.3, with a male-female ratio close to one. The 
average age of household heads, which are predominantly male, is approximately 50 
years. Ninety percent of household heads have never attended formal school, and 
                                                                                                                                               
migration survey was conducted which included 20 households from our larger sample. 
10 of those households received 100 percent discount rates.  
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therefore the average amount of completed education is only half a year which is quite 
low even relative to an average of 4.7 years across all Ethiopian households (McIntosh 
et al., 2013).  
The average monthly household consumption per capita is 321 birr,7 and 46 
percent of the household, using the $1.25 (purchasing power parity) per day poverty line, 
fall into poverty. Those households that subsequently purchased IBLI tend to be 
wealthier than those that did not. As noted previously, the predominant source of 
income is livestock, including milk and meat production, which accounts for 
approximately 59 percent of total household income. Other income sources, such as 
crop production and other off-farm activities, play a relatively minor role; only 15 
percent of households derive income from crop production with the unconditional 
average share of crop income within the total household income to be only 6 percent 
and average cultivated land size of 1.4 acres. Livestock comprises the overwhelming 
majority of households’ non-human assets. The average TLU of animal owned by 
sample households are 14.7, dominated by large cattle herds supplemented with goats, 
sheep, and camels.  
==Table 2. here == 
Table 2 shows the percent of sampled households that purchased IBLI in each 
sales period as well as the average animals insured, in terms of TLU and TIHV, 
separately for those who purchased IBLI in both periods, only the first period, only the 
second period, and never purchased. About 30 percent of sampled households purchased 
IBLI during the first period, but that rate declined to 18 percent in the second period. 
                                                 
7 1 USD is equivalent to 17.42 Ethiopian birr as of February 2012.  
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Only 24 out of 474 households bought IBLI in both sales periods to generate 
overlapping coverage for the March-September 2013 period. The number of insured 
TLU is also small. The unconditional mean is only 0.79 at the first period and 0.50 in 
the second period, which represents less than 5 percent of all animals owned. The 
average TIHV is 4.1 thousand birr in the first sales period and 2.6 thousand birr at the 
second sales period, respectively, which are close to or only slightly greater than the 
monthly household income. Those who purchased IBLI during both sales periods tend 
to insure more animals than those who purchased it in either the first or second period 
only. But the overall pattern of purchase suggests that households were experimenting 
with the new product by purchasing a limited amount of coverage for their herds, 
although this represented a substantial outlay relative to household income. 
==Table 3. here == 
Table 3 displays the main reason the 2013 survey respondents gave for not 
purchasing IBLI. The top two reasons are the lack of cash followed by the lack of 
knowledge about IBLI, mimicking the major constraints commonly raised across other 
index-based insurance pilots in the developing world (Cai et al., 2013; Cole et al., 2013; 
Gaurav et al. 2011; Gine et al., 2008; Karlan et al., 2014; Platteau & Ontiveros, 2013) 
despite the fact that the previously described random encouragement design employed 
in this study aimed to mitigate such constraints.  
==Table 4. here == 
Table 4 shows the sources of information for those respondents who had heard 
about IBLI, also collected in the 2013 survey round. DAs and ILRI staff played major 
roles as information channels, with 86 percent and 67 percent of respondents citing 
them as IBLI information sources respectively. Meanwhile, a non-negligible number of 
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households claimed to obtain information about IBLI through the encouragement 
designs, although some treated respondents did not recognize these as an IBLI 
information source.  
To obtain deeper insights into the effect of the learning kits, in the 2013 survey 
we implemented an eight question quiz about IBLI, ranging from questions about the 
insurer, the conditions, frequency, and amount of indemnity payout, to simple 
computations of premiums and payouts under hypothetical scenarios. The number of 
correct answers is statistically significantly larger among respondents who received the 
learning kit treatments, either a comic or a skit, during the second sales period, when the 
experimental implementation was more closely supervised and done correctly (Table 5).  
==Table 5. here == 
Figure 3 displays the relationship between TIHV and a household-specific 
premium rate, where a household-specific premium rate is defined as8:  
𝑇𝐻𝑃𝐻𝑃ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑜 𝐻𝑝𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑠 𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑃= (1 − 𝑜𝑃𝐻𝑠𝐻𝑃𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑃) ∗ 𝑊𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑝 𝐻𝑝𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑠 𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑃.  
As expected, the IBLI uptake decreases with the household-specific premium rates, 
suggesting that IBLI demand is price responsive and that discount coupons may induce 
uptake. Descriptively, the encouragement design seems to have contributed to spreading 
information about the existence of IBLI as well as to inducing uptake in the study sites. 
==Figure 3. here == 
4. Estimation Strategy 
                                                 
8  For households that did not receive a discount coupon, their premium rate is 
equivalent to the woreda specific premium rate. Premium rates at the woreda level did 
not vary with sales period, while the discount rates at the household level varied with 
the sales period.  
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In order to more rigorously study the effectiveness of these encouragement 
designs and a broader set of constraints to IBLI uptake, we turn to multivariate 
regression analysis. We are interested in not only whether or not households choose to 
buy IBLI in a given sales period, but also how many animals they choose to insure, 
measured by TIHV, conditional on purchasing an IBLI policy. Since more than half of 
all households do not buy IBLI at all, parameters estimated via Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) would be biased and inconsistent. One standard approach to consistently 
estimating a model with a continuous dependent variable with censored observations is 
the standard Tobit model. The standard Tobit (i.e., Type I Tobit), however, imposes a 
rather restrictive assumption that the decision to buy IBLI and decisions about how 
many TLU to insure are determined by a single process, which need not be true.  
To overcome the restrictive assumptions inherent in the standard Tobit model, 
we employ the “double-hurdle” (DH) model originally proposed by Cragg (1971). The 
DH model is more flexible than the standard Tobit in that it assumes the observed 
demand for IBLI can be decided in a step-wise manner, i.e., first the decision whether or 
not to buy IBLI, followed by the second decision on the quantity of animals to insure.9 
The underlying decision-making process of the DH model can be expressed as:  
                                                 
9 Another approach is the generalized Tobit model, including the Heckman selection 
model. As with the DH model, the Heckman selection model takes into account the 
two-step decision making process. The major difference between the Heckman selection 
model and DH model is that the former is designed for incidental truncation where 
zeros are unobserved due to self-selection. In other words, the Heckman model assumes 
that there will be no zero observations in the second stage, once the first-stage selection 
is passed, while the DH model allows for the option of deliberate zero observations. 
Although both models seem relevant in our context, we prefer the DH model because it 
nests the Heckman model. The estimated results via the Heckman model are 
qualitatively similar to the DH model.  
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where itd is a binary indicator variable to describe whether household i bought IBLI 
during sales period t, y represents TIHV, *d  and *y  are the unobserved latent 
variables, m and X  are vectors of explanatory variables, and α  and β  are 
estimated parameters. Because we observe two separate sales periods, this model can be 
run separately for each period.  
Following Cragg (1971), we assume that the first-hurdle error term itξ  and 
second-hurdle error tem ite  (e.g., error terms in equations (1) and (2)) are independently 
and normally distributed with zero mean at each sales period. While covariance between 
those errors can be non-zero, Garcia & Labeaga (1996) and Jones (1992), among others, 
show that estimated results are quite similar regardless of whether the assumption of 
zero covariance is relaxed. To reduce computational burdens, we maintain the 
assumption of zero covariance between the first- and second-hurdle error terms. Given 
independent error terms, the log likelihood function for the DH model can be equivalent 
to the sum of the log-likelihoods of a probit model and truncated regression model 
(Burke, 2009; Cragg, 1971). Thus, separate regressions for the first hurdle with the 
probit, followed by the second hurdle with the truncated regression, yield consistent 
estimates with the DH model described above (Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, & Chirwa, 2011).  
  Major explanatory variables of interest in the first- and second sales period DH 
models include the effective price of IBLI faced by each household and the knowledge 
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of IBLI. The former is captured by the inclusion of household and sales period specific 
premium rates as well as a dummy variable to represent which households received a 
discount coupon. As shown in Appendix 1, we found a significant difference between 
the administrative records on discount coupon disbursement and households’ 
self-reported receipt of coupons. Since the administrative records precisely capture the 
results of random assignment, we prefer to include them over self-reports. If there is any 
noncompliance in distributing those coupons, as implied in the first sales period given 
reports to ILRI, our estimates will reflect “intention to treat” effects.  
Knowledge of IBLI is proxied using the number of correct answers to a quiz 
about IBLI administered during data collection. The data are derived only from the 
second wave of the survey because we did not ask the knowledge of IBLI at the time of 
baseline survey, as the product had not yet been designed or marketed. An obvious 
concern is that households with greater interest in IBLI know more about the product 
and are more likely to buy, or that knowledge of IBLI increases after a household 
bought IBLI, causing an endogeneity problem. To address this, we apply a two-step 
estimation strategy, where we first estimate the number of correct answers to the quiz, 
using the learning kits experimental treatments as instruments, and then estimate the DH 
models including the predicted number of correct answers from the first stage as one of 
the regressors. The intent to treat dummies of skit tapes and comics,10 which are purely 
exogenous by experimental design, are used as instruments to identify the exogenous 
component of knowledge of IBLI but are excluded from the demand model under the 
assumption that the learning kits should only influence uptake through an increase in 
                                                 
10 We again use the administrative record, instead of respondents’ self-reporting, for 
these variables.  
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knowledge.   
Other controls are constructed from the baseline survey to minimize potential 
endogeneity concerns and to provide an ex ante picture of the household before IBLI 
was introduced (see Appendix 2 for a full list of explanatory variables). These include: 
(1) monthly per capita household income and the proportion of household income from 
livestock, (2) household livestock holdings, measured in TLU, and a squared term to 
allow for nonlinear effects; (3) the value of non-livestock assets, represented by a 
wealth index computed using principal component analysis; (4) the amount of cultivated 
land, (5) characteristics of the household and household head, such as household size 
and age, years of completed education, and gender of household head; (6) the 
household’s subjective expected livestock mortality within the year following the 
baseline survey; (7) dummy variables that capture whether households expect livestock 
prices to increase or to remain the same within a year from the baseline survey; (8) risk 
tolerance dummies elicited through field experiments following Binswanger (1980)11; 
and (9) woreda dummy variables, which function as controls for the woreda-level 
unobservables. Standard errors are clustered at the study site level for all regressions.  
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Static Estimation 
==Table 6. here == 
                                                 
11 We do not use an estimated cardinal value of risk preference, such as the midpoints 
of the imputed constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) intervals, because such a CRRA 
coefficient estimate imposes strong assumptions on the shape of preferences and may 
not precisely reflect Arrow-Pratt risk preferences if there exist any threshold effects in 
underlying wealth dynamics (Lybbert & Barrett, 2011).   
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Table 6 presents the estimated results of the first step regression for factors 
associated with the knowledge of IBLI. The first sales-period coupon recipients tend to 
have better knowledge about IBLI. The second sales period random “learning kit” 
assignments are positively correlated with the number of correct answers, while the first 
sales period assignments are not, which might be because some DAs did not implement 
these random assignments correctly during the first sales period, as explained earlier. 
Other important determinants of IBLI knowledge include education of the household 
head, which has the positive impacts.  
==Table 7. here == 
The main estimation results on the DH model, incorporating instrumented 
values of the number of correct answers to quiz from the first step regression above, are 
presented in Table 7, where the dependent variable of probit regressions (i.e., columns 
(1), and (3)) takes one if the household bought IBLI during that sales period, while the 
dependent variable of the truncated regressions (i.e., columns (2) and (4)) represents 
TIHV measured in thousand birr. The predicted number of correct answers to the quiz is 
negatively correlated with the probability of purchase IBLI in the first sales period, but 
positively related to the insured value of livestock in the second period, and statistically 
insignificantly related to TIHV in the first sales period and the probability of uptake in 
the second. The results are thus mixed, implying that while the learning kits improve 
knowledge of IBLI, the improved knowledge via these encouragement devices may not 
induce greater uptake. Note that naïve estimation with the number of correct answers to 
quiz based on the actual (not predicted) value, a clearly endogenous variable, generates 
consistently positive, and mostly strongly statistically significant, coefficient estimates 
(Panel A of Appendix 3). It is apparent that those wishing to buy IBLI make an effort to 
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learn more about it. 
 Household demand for IBLI is clearly sensitive to the price the household faces. 
In each sales period, the household-and-round-specific premium rates consistently and 
negatively affect the decision to purchase as well as the value of animals insured. The 
estimated marginal impacts12 of the premium rates are -1.65 and -1.22 at the first and 
second sales periods, respectively, implying that that a decrease in the premium rate by 
one percentage point is associated with increases in the value of animal insured by 1.65 
and 1.22 thousand birr at the first and second sales periods, respectively. Controlling for 
price, IBLI demand is not significantly and consistently affected by whether households 
receive a coupon or not, except for the decision to buy IBLI in the first sales period, 
during which coupon recipients were more likely to purchase IBLI.13  
Note that the discounted premium rates may have income effects aside from the 
pure price effect. Although we expect such income effects are small in our context, as 
the reduction in the premium rate is minor relative to the total household income, we 
                                                 
12 These marginal impacts reflect unconditional average partial effects of the discount 
premium rate on IBLI demand. The marginal impacts on the value of insured animal 
conditional on purchase of IBLI are -3.12 and -2.75 at the first and second period, 
respectively. These estimates are obtained using the craggit user-written command in 
Stata (Burke, 2009).  
13 We re-estimated the model with the coupon dummy and the discounted premium 
rates based on self-reports, rather than administrative records for both the prediction of 
the number of correct answers to quiz and the demand for IBLI. The results, presented 
in Panel B of Appendix 3, show the mixed effects of the coupon dummy. While coupon 
recipients are more likely to purchase IBLI, they tend to insure less value of animals. 
On the one hand, coupon recipients may be more encouraged by DAs and ILRI staff to 
buy IBLI when they receive the coupon. On the other hand, however, self-motivated 
people, who are willing to buy IBLI even without the discount coupon, tend to buy 
more IBLI than those motivated by the experiments. These effects may cause an 
opposing effect in the different sales period.  
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cannot rule out that possibility. Indeed, the estimated results show that the increased 
household income tends to increase the total insured value of livestock.  
The proportion of income from livestock is positively correlated with the 
probability of buying IBLI during the first sales period, reflecting that households with 
more diversified income portfolios are less likely to rely on IBLI as a risk-coping 
mechanism. This view is also partly supported by the coefficient estimates on cultivated 
land size, which tend to show the negative impacts, implying that those households with 
more crop income generating capacity are less likely to rely on IBLI.14   
 As Table 3 shows, insufficient livestock holdings is an important reason 
provided by households for not purchasing IBLI. However, through regression analysis, 
we find that total household TLU holdings largely do not affect the decision to purchase 
IBLI independent of the share of income earned from livestock. On the other hand, 
wealth index shows that wealthier people are more likely to insure more animals in both 
the first and second sales periods.  
Other socio-economic characteristics of the household and household head are 
also associated with IBLI demand. First, male-headed households are more likely to buy 
larger insurance policies in the first sales period, although they are less likely to buy 
IBLI in the second sales period. Second, although we a priori expected the education of 
the household to be positively associated with IBLI demand, it is actually negatively 
correlated in three of four models, statistically significantly so for two of them. 
Households that expect livestock prices to remain constant or rise are more 
likely to buy IBLI and tend to insure greater animal value. On the other hand, risk 
                                                 
14 The results hold true with alternative definitions of coupon recipients and the number 
of correct answers to quiz, especially in the second sales period, as shown in Appendix 
3.  
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preference dummies are largely negative, and statistically significant in some cases, 
suggesting that risk-averse households buy IBLI more. This is consistent with the 
conventional theory, although several existing studies on index insurance products show 
mixed results (Gine et al., 2008).  
 
5.2. Dynamic Estimation 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the demand of IBLI at each sales 
period is independent over time. Yet, one may argue that the second sales period choice 
would be conditional on the first sales period, particularly since the two coverage 
periods overlap. Also, as information diffuses and people learn from their own and 
others’ experiences perceptions about and demand for IBLI may change over time. To 
account for such potential dynamic adoption behavior, we use a slightly modified 
version of the DH model. Instead of using the univariate probit model in the first hurdle 
at the second sales period, as in equation (1), we apply an endogenous switching probit 
model where first sales period purchasers and non-purchasers of IBLI are separated into 
different regimes to decide whether to buy IBLI in the second sales period. This 
modifies the equations (1) and (2) to:  
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where 1im  is the vector of household characteristics during the first sales period; 1α is 
the coefficient of observed characteristics during the first sales period; 1iξ  is the error 
term during the first sales period; I[] is the indicator function; *12id  and 
*0
2id  are latent 
variables for the observed demand status during the second sales period with a 
superscript 1 to represent purchasers and 0 non-purchasers of IBLI in the previous 
period; 2im  is the the vector of household characteristics that prospectively affect 
demand in the second sales period; 12α  and 
0
2α  are regime-specific coefficients, and 
1
2iu  and 
0
2iu  are the regime-specific error terms for the second sales period. Error terms 
1iξ , 
1
2iu , and 
0
2iu  are assumed to be jointly and normally distributed with zero mean. 
The covariance matrix is  
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where 1uρ  is the correlation between the unobserved characteristics predicting 
purchase during the first sales period and continuous purchase during the second sales 
period. A positive covariance estimate suggests interperiod complementarity, perhaps by 
reducing liquidity constraints on coverage, or learning over time. A negative estimate 
suggests instead that those who purchased IBLI at the first period are less likely to adopt 
in the second. The parameter 0uρ  represents the correlation between non-purchase 
during the first sales period and new purchase during the second sales period. Since *12id  
and *02id  are never observed simultaneously, the joint distribution of (
1
2iu ,
0
2iu ), and 
consequently, 01ρ  cannot be identified, so we have to impose the assumption of unit 
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variance. The model is estimable via a full information maximum likelihood switching 
probit model.15 We then estimate the separate truncated regression in equation (6) to 
examine factors determining TIHV at the second sales period, conditional on purchase.  
In the second sales period estimation, we add the discount premium rate and 
the dummy for coupon recipient in the previous sales period to the vector of regressors, 
allowing for persistence in the effect of initial sales period treatments in subsequent 
sales periods. This allows for the possibility that one-off subsidies on a product might 
reduce future demand as people anchor around the reduced price and become unwilling 
to pay more for the product later (Dupas, 2014; Fischer et al., 2014). We test whether 
one-shot price subsidies can have immediate impacts on uptake through the coefficient 
estimates on the current period discount rate, while also testing whether they have 
longer-term effects via the coefficient estimates on the previous period discount rate16.   
==Table 8. here == 
  The results are presented in Table 8. The qualitative inference for the first sales 
period (Column 1) is quite similar to the previous findings of the static model. But we 
can now infer something about the dynamic pattern of IBLI uptake based on the 
correlation of the error terms ( 1uρ , 0uρ ). Among the first period purchasers (Column 2), 
the correlation coefficient of the first and second period purchase ( 1uρ ) is negative and 
statistically significant, implying that those who purchased IBLI during the first sales 
period do not tend to buy it in the subsequent period as well. The first period coupon 
                                                 
15  Although the use of instruments is recommended, the model is identified by 
non-linearity even if the vector of observables perfectly overlap in Equations (3)–(5) 
(Lokshin & Glinskaya, 2009). 
16 We did not include these variables in the static model so as to make variables 
perfectly comparable between the first and second sales periods.  
26 
 
dummy is negative and significant for non-purchasers at the first sales period (Column 
3). This seems to indicate that if someone was likely to purchase, that was likely to 
occur when they got a coupon, so having not purchased when one got a coupon is an 
especially good predictor that one is not likely to purchase later. The (potentially 
discounted) price in the first sales period has no statistically significant effect on the 
second sales period decision to purchase in terms of either probability or volume, 
indicating that there is no price anchoring effect.17 The results imply that, in order to 
familiarize pastoralists with IBLI and induce initial experimentation with a new product, 
it may be effective to motivate them by reducing the price temporarily through discount 
coupons, without compromising the ability to charge full price later, although we should 
not infer too much from these results since we only observe two sales periods.  
The factors associated with purchase during the second sales period differ 
between early adopters who purchased during the first sales period and non-adopters 
who did not purchase during the first sales period. For example, accurate knowledge of 
IBLI is not associated with IBLI purchase in the second sales period if a household has 
already bought it in the previous period, while it does for a household who has not 
previously purchased IBLI. Livestock holdings are statistically significantly associated 
with the probability of buying IBLI, once error terms are allowed to be correlated over 
time. Interestingly, their relationship is not monotonic, but U-shaped for early adopters 
and inverse-U-shaped for early non-adopters. The inversed U-shaped demand for early 
non-adopters seems to be consistent with the traditional view of multiple herd size 
equilibria, where the demand for IBLI is highest among pastoralists with herd size 
                                                 
17 Because we control for the second-period price, inclusion of the first-period price or 
the difference between the second-period and first-period prices as an additional 
regressor does not alter the result.  
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slightly greater than the threshold at which herd dynamics bifurcate in order to avoid 
falling into a poverty trap (Carter & Barrett, 2006; Chantarat, Mude, Barrett, & 
Narayanan, 2014; Lybbert et al., 2004; Santos & Barrett, 2011). On the other hand, 
U-shaped demand for early adapters supports Janzen, Carter, & Ikegami (2013)’s 
prediction that vulnerable households with livestock holding just above the critical 
threshold demand index based asset insurance less due to basis risk and purchase 
productive assets instead.  
  
6. Conclusions 
Index insurance is increasingly recognized as a promising means of protecting 
the poor from losses associated with climate shocks. Attempts have been made 
worldwide in the past decade to introduce innovative index-based weather insurance 
products that should be free from the classical incentive problems and high transactions 
costs of conventional indemnity insurance. These products have, however, commonly 
suffered from low uptake rates that may be due to their coverage of transitory income 
losses associated with crop failure, rather than asset loss that leads to permanent income 
decline.  
We study demand for a new index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product 
introduced in southern Ethiopia among pastoralists whose permanent incomes depend 
heavily on livestock, in an attempt to explore factors underlying the demand for asset 
index insurance. We focus specifically on the role of product knowledge and price in 
uptake decisions, exploiting the random assignment of randomly assigned learning kits 
and discount coupons to identify estimates of the causal relationships between those 
factors and IBLI demand.  
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We find that IBLI uptake rates, approaching 30 percent in the initial year of 
product offer, exceed that of most other index-based insurance products in their pilot 
periods. Our estimation results show that consumer education through the provision of 
skit audio tapes and comics improves knowledge of the product, but that a more 
accurate understanding of IBLI does not significantly induce uptake. Although several 
prior studies conjecture that lack of understanding of the index insurance product is a 
key constraint on adoption, and indeed our survey respondents also reported that as a 
main reason for not purchasing IBLI, our empirical evidence does not strongly support 
this argument.  
We do, however, find that price incentives created through discount coupons 
effectively and substantially increase current period uptake rates without lowering 
future demand by creating a low price reference point. It therefore appears advisable 
that encouragement designs of this sort can indeed help encourage uptake in the early 
phase of diffusion of a new index insurance product, which may in turn induce more 
rapid diffusion and as a result substantially enhance the resilience of households in 
vulnerable climates and livelihoods. 
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Figure 1. IBLI Boran Household Survey Sites 
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Figure 2. Calendar of the IBLI Boran contract  
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Figure 3. IBLI Demand Curve 
 
Note: The vertical axis measures the discounted premium rate (%), defined as the woreda-specific 
premium rate multiplied by one minus the household-specific discount rate. The horizontal axis 
measures the total value of insured animals, where each camel, cattle, and goat/sheep is equivalent to 
15, 5, and 0.7 thousand birr, respectively. Solid and dashed lines represent the lowess smoothing 
curves for the first and second sales period, respectively. (n=474)   
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Table 1. Baseline Socio-economic Characteristics of the Sampled Households (March 
2012) 
  Full sample 
Never 
purchase 
IBLI 
Purchased 
IBLI in at 
least one sales 
period 
t test         
p-value 
Household size 6.257 6.395 6.074 0.164 
 
(2.486) (2.649) (2.243) 
 
% Male member 49.476 50.151 48.575 0.328 
 
(17.325) (16.793) (18.014) 
 
Household head characteristics 
    
Age 50.209 50.919 49.261 0.326 
 
(18.145) (18.365) (17.849) 
 
Male (=1) 0.793 0.819 0.759 0.108 
 
(0.405) (0.386) (0.429) 
 
% with no education 90.084 88.561 92.118 0.201 
 
(29.919) (31.887) (27.012) 
 
Completed years of education 0.504 0.616 0.355 0.123 
 
(1.826) (2.037) (1.490) 
 
Household economy 
    
Monthly consumption per capita (birr) 321.987 306.695 342.401 0.081* 
 
(220.248) (200.531) (243.119) 
 
Poverty (=1)  0.462 0.509 0.399 0.017** 
 
(0.499) (0.501) (0.491) 
 
Access to community land (=1) 0.572 0.576 0.567 0.843 
 
(0.495) (0.495) (0.497) 
 
Cultivated land size (acre) 1.420 1.353 1.508 0.425 
 
(2.083) (1.899) (2.309) 
 
Owned animal (TLU) 14.683 13.287 16.545 0.114 
 
(22.195) (16.874) (27.692) 
 
Monthly per capita income (birr) 467.381 447.129 494.417 0.276 
 
(466.933) (433.578) (507.906) 
 
Share (%) of income 
    
Crop 5.730 5.995 5.376 0.686 
 
(16.479) (16.033) (17.090) 
 
Livestock 59.320 56.976 62.448 0.047* 
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(29.644) (29.728) (29.314) 
 
Other labor earnings 6.700 7.796 5.236 0.025* 
 
(12.330) (14.197) (9.101) 
 
Remittances/assistance 28.250 29.232 26.940 0.318 
  (24.716) (25.119) (24.167) 
 
Observations 474 271 203   
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The t-test represents the difference in 
characteristics between households that have never purchased IBLI and those that have 
in at least one sales period. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2. Patterns of IBLI Purchase, 2012-2013 
  Full sample 
Households 
that 
purchased 
IBLI    in 
both 1st and 
2nd sales 
periods 
Households 
that 
purchased 
IBLI            
only in 1st 
sales period 
Households 
that 
purchased 
IBLI            
only in 2nd 
sales period 
Households 
that never 
purchased 
IBLI   
1st sales period (August 2012) 
     
% Household buy IBLI 29.536 100.000 100.000 - - 
 
(45.669) (0.000) (0.000) - - 
Insured TLU 0.794 4.425 2.330 - - 
 
(2.409) (5.403) (3.325) - - 
Insured TLU conditional on Purchase 2.689 4.425 2.330 - - 
 
(3.822) (5.403) (3.325) - - 
Insured TIHV ('000 ETB) 4.153 23.242 12.159 - - 
 
(12.275) (27.492) (16.667) - - 
Insured TIHV ('000 ETB) conditional on purchase 14.059 23.242 12.159 - - 
 
(19.299) (27.492) (16.667) - - 
2nd sales period (February 2013) 
     
% Household buy IBLI 18.354 100.000 - 100.000 - 
 
(38.752) (0.000) - (0.000) - 
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Insured TLU 0.503 5.133 - 1.830 - 
 
(2.101) (6.032) - (2.920) - 
Insured TLU conditional on Purchase 2.741 5.133 - 1.830 - 
 
(4.252) (6.032) - (2.920) - 
Insured TIHV ('000 ETB) 2.639 25.850 - 10.011 - 
 
(10.814) (30.052) - (15.806) - 
Insured TIHV ('000 ETB) conditional on purchase 14.380 25.850 - 10.011 - 
  (21.734) (30.052) - (15.806) - 
Observations 474 24 116 63 271 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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Table 3. Most important reported reasons for non-purchase of IBLI, 2012-2013 
 
  
1st sales period 
  
2nd sales period  
Aug 2012 Feb 2013 
  
Number of 
observations 
%   
Number of 
observations 
% 
Do not have money to spend on insurance 71 24.7 
 
99 31.5 
Did not understand insurance well enough to buy it 100 34.7 
 
49 15.6 
Did not have an opportunity to buy it 50 17.4 
 
65 20.7 
Do not have enough animals 41 14.2 
 
57 18.2 
Waiting to see what happens to the people who bought insurance 11 3.8 
 
20 6.4 
Do not think insurance will help me 7 2.4 
 
7 2.2 
Afraid of uncertainty in insurance 2 0.7 
 
9 2.9 
Do not trust any insurance companies 3 1.0 
 
3 1.0 
Can rely on family and friends 2 0.7 
 
4 1.3 
Discouraged by someone in the community  1 0.4 
 
1 0.3 
Total 288 100   314 100 
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Table 4. Percent of households that learned about IBLI from potential sources, 2013 
 
DA  86.2 
ILRI staff  67.1 
Friends/Neighbors  48.0 
Community Meeting  47.3 
Discount Coupon  48.7 
Comic  24.7 
Skit  12.4 
Oromia Insurance Company 9.1 
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Table 5. The Number of Correct Answers to IBLI Quiz by Recipient of Learning Kits, 
2013 
 
  No kit Kit 
t-test            
p-value 
1st sales period 4.461 4.419 0.828 
 
(0.121) (0.146) 
 
2nd sales period 4.207 4.960 0.000*** 
  (0.118) (0.141) 
 
Note: “Kit” refers to the sample of households that received either a skit or comic in the 
reference period. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01
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Table 6: First stage estimation results: IBLI understanding 
    
Dependent variable: The number of correct answers to quiz 
    
Coupon at the 1st sales period (=1) 0.628*** 
 
(0.234) 
Comic at the 1st sales period  (=1) 0.281 
 
(0.240) 
Skit at the 1st sales period  (=1) -0.333 
 
(0.268) 
Coupon at the 2nd sales period (=1) 0.143 
 
(0.240) 
Comic at the 2nd sales period  (=1) 1.136*** 
 
(0.233) 
Skit at the 2nd sales period (=1) 0.580** 
 
(0.244) 
Per capita household income ('000 ETB) -0.155 
 
(0.283) 
TLU 0.007 
 
(0.010) 
TLU squared -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Proportion of income from livestock 0.001 
 
(0.003) 
Cultivated land (acre) 0.001 
 
(0.054) 
Wealth index 0.016 
 
(0.109) 
HH size -0.050 
 
(0.047) 
Head age 0.001 
 
(0.031) 
Head age squared -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Head male  (=1) 0.388 
 
(0.238) 
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Head’ completed years of education 0.127** 
 
(0.054) 
Expected mortality rate -0.002 
 
(0.003) 
Expected livestock price (unchange) (=1) a -0.402 
 
(0.365) 
Expected livestock price (higher) (=1) a 0.191 
 
(0.215) 
Moderate risk averse (=1) b 0.027 
 
(0.224) 
Less risk averse  (=1) b -0.250 
 
(0.211) 
Constant 3.952*** 
  (0.920) 
Woreda dummy variables YES 
Observations 474 
R-squared 0.188 
Joint F-test on Comic and skit tape dummies in both periods 7.56*** 
Joint F-test on Comic and skit tape dummies only in the 2nd period 12.78*** 
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust clustered standard errors at the study-site level are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a The omitted category is that expected livestock price becomes lower. b The omitted 
category is extremely risk averse.  
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Table 7. Second stage estimation results on demand for IBLI (static double hurdle model) 
Sales Period   1st    2nd  
Dependent variable 
 
Dummy for IBLI purchase 
 
Total insured herd value 
 
Dummy for IBLI purchase 
 
Total insured herd value 
Estimation model  Probit 
 
Truncated regression 
 
Probit 
 
Truncated regression 
  
 
             
# correct answer on IBLI quiz: predicted 
 
-0.292** 
 
-1.591 
 
0.206* 
 
6.811 
  
(0.141) 
 
(4.839) 
 
(0.118) 
 
(5.794) 
Period specific coupon recipient (=1) 
 
0.460** 
 
-21.517 
 
0.113 
 
-35.702 
  
(0.205) 
 
(25.365) 
 
(0.334) 
 
(64.720) 
Household-period specific premium rate  
 
-0.125*** 
 
-15.583*** 
 
-0.194*** 
 
-19.053*** 
  
(0.029) 
 
(3.630) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(2.861) 
Per capita household income ('000 ETB) 
 
-0.087 
 
21.245** 
 
0.127 
 
13.280* 
  
(0.156) 
 
(8.605) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(7.886) 
Proportion of income from livestock 
 
0.008** 
 
0.109 
 
0.000 
 
0.165 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.163) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.175) 
Cultivated land (acre) 
 
0.033 
 
1.766* 
 
-0.116*** 
 
-3.271* 
  
(0.030) 
 
(0.963) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(1.762) 
TLU 
 
-0.012 
 
0.344 
 
0.007 
 
0.144 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.309) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.385) 
TLU squared 
 
0.000 
 
-0.003* 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.002) 
Wealth index 
 
0.046 
 
2.874** 
 
-0.069 
 
9.660** 
  
(0.038) 
 
(1.374) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(3.930) 
HH size 
 
-0.023 
 
4.264 
 
0.008 
 
0.083 
  
(0.031) 
 
(2.708) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(1.724) 
Head age 
 
-0.009 
 
2.121 
 
-0.026 
 
0.613 
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(0.021) 
 
(1.786) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(1.159) 
Head age squared 
 
0.000 
 
-0.021 
 
0.000 
 
-0.003 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.009) 
Head male  (=1) 
 
0.086 
 
29.431** 
 
-0.373** 
 
13.963 
  
(0.183) 
 
(12.353) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(10.065) 
Head’ completed years of education 
 
0.012 
 
-7.536*** 
 
-0.127** 
 
-2.988 
  
(0.029) 
 
(2.349) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(2.157) 
Expected mortality rate 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.090 
 
0.002 
 
-0.200 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.125) 
Expected livestock price (unchange) (=1) a 
 
-0.087 
 
13.067 
 
0.549** 
 
-0.525 
  
(0.278) 
 
(11.463) 
 
(0.274) 
 
(8.332) 
Expected livestock price (higher) (=1) a 
 
0.193 
 
-1.273 
 
0.073 
 
25.490* 
  
(0.138) 
 
(8.182) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(13.758) 
Moderate risk averse (=1) b 
 
0.020 
 
-21.147** 
 
0.105 
 
6.387 
  
(0.174) 
 
(9.758) 
 
(0.194) 
 
(13.059) 
Less risk averse  (=1) b 
 
-0.127 
 
-11.124 
 
-0.491** 
 
-18.496 
  
(0.117) 
 
(9.560) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(15.172) 
Constant 
 
1.003 
 
-1.457 
 
-0.744 
 
0.887 
   (0.914)  (56.217)   (0.819)  (95.815) 
Woreda dummies 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Observations  474  474  474  474 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the study-site level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
a The omitted category is that expected livestock price becomes lower. b The omitted category is extremely risk averse.  
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Table 8. Dynamic endogenous switching model of demand for IBLI (Double Hurdle Model) 
Sales period 1st   2nd 
Dependent variable Dummy for  IBLI purchase  Total insured herd value 
Estimation model Switching probit   Truncated regression 
1st sales period demand status   
 
Purchase 
 
Non-purchase 
 
  
 (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
# correct answer on IBLI quiz: predicted -0.263* 
 
-0.613* 
 
0.569*** 
 
6.011 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.367) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(4.929) 
1st period coupon (=1) 0.401* 
 
0.243 
 
-0.803** 
 
-30.380 
 
(0.222) 
 
(1.077) 
 
(0.354) 
 
(18.908) 
Household-round specific premium rate at the 1st period -0.126*** 
 
-0.084 
 
0.013 
 
-4.214 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(3.278) 
2nd period coupon (=1) 
  
-1.978 
 
0.349 
 
-18.950 
   
(1.254) 
 
(0.392) 
 
(53.030) 
Household-round specific premium rate at the 2nd period 
  
-0.651*** 
 
-0.144*** 
 
-15.128*** 
   
(0.205) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(2.856) 
Per capita household income ('000 ETB) -0.090 
 
2.451*** 
 
0.060 
 
10.982 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.859) 
 
(0.159) 
 
(8.084) 
Proportion of income from livestock 0.008** 
 
0.030** 
 
-0.004 
 
0.184 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.135) 
Cultivated land (acre) 0.038 
 
-0.407*** 
 
-0.087*** 
 
-2.202 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(1.569) 
TLU -0.012 
 
-0.046 
 
0.025** 
 
0.222 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.352) 
TLU squared (‘000) 0.119 
 
0.656*** 
 
-0.177* 
 
-0.857 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.227) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(1.700) 
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Wealth index 0.044 
 
-0.188 
 
-0.239*** 
 
7.909** 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(3.691) 
HH size -0.024 
 
0.129 
 
-0.012 
 
-0.737 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(1.470) 
Head age -0.008 
 
0.010 
 
-0.021 
 
0.581 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.035) 
 
(1.019) 
Head age squared 0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.003 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.009) 
Head male  (=1) 0.074 
 
0.138 
 
-0.556*** 
 
10.769 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.738) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(9.763) 
Head’ completed years of education 0.009 
 
-0.436*** 
 
-0.150* 
 
-2.446 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(2.454) 
Expected mortality rate -0.000 
 
-0.005 
 
0.003 
 
-0.130 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.118) 
Expected livestock price (unchange) (=1) a -0.062 
 
-0.079 
 
0.660** 
 
-2.910 
 
(0.240) 
 
(0.618) 
 
(0.294) 
 
(9.232) 
Expected livestock price (higher) (=1) a 0.231* 
 
-0.130 
 
0.064 
 
17.693 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.397) 
 
(0.195) 
 
(13.519) 
Moderate risk averse (=1) b 0.018 
 
-0.159 
 
0.120 
 
7.596 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.431) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(11.895) 
Less risk averse  (=1) b -0.118 
 
-0.602 
 
-0.382* 
 
-14.431 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.601) 
 
(0.213) 
 
(14.325) 
Constant 0.891 
 
3.411 
 
-2.473*** 
 
32.847 
  (0.884)  (2.822)  (0.730)  (66.968) 
Woreda dummy variables YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
1uρ  
  
-0.326** 
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(0.151) 
 
 
  0uρ  
    
-14.813 
  
 
    
(98.551) 
  Observations 474   474  474  474 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the study-site level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.001 
a The omitted category is that expected livestock price becomes lower. b The omitted category is extremely risk averse.  
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Appendix 1. Number of sample households that received a discount coupon 
 
 Sales period 1st 
 
2nd 
  Self-report 
Administrative 
record 
  Self-report 
Administrative 
record 
      
Coupon Recipients 213 380 
 
212 383 
      
% discounted 
     
0 324 94 
 
330 91 
10 16 43 
 
21 46 
20 17 44 
 
22 45 
30 14 42 
 
13 49 
40 16 49 
 
12 50 
50 18 46 
 
17 42 
60 15 43 
 
22 43 
70 18 50 
 
13 45 
80 31 53 
 
18 53 
100 5 10   6 10 
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Appendix 2. Definition of variables in the regression analysis 
Variables Type Definition Data source Mean s.d. 
1st period IBLI (=1) dummy  
1 if a household purchased IBLI at the 1st sales 
period 
2nd round 
  
# correct answer out of eight Integer # correct answers to quiz on IBLI. 2nd round 4.45 2.03 
1st period coupon (=1)  dummy  
1 if a household receives discount coupon at 1st sales 
period 
2nd round 0.80 0.40 
Household-period specific premium rate at 1st period Numeric 
woreda premium rate * (1- household-level discount 
rate at 1st sales period) 
2nd round 5.54 2.69 
2nd period coupon (=1)  dummy  
1 if a household receives discount coupon at 2nd 
sales period 
2nd round 0.81 0.39 
Household-period specific premium rate at 2nd period Numeric 
woreda premium rate * (1- household-level discount 
rate at 2nd sales period) 
2nd round 5.59 2.66 
Moderate risk averse and less risk averse dummy  
In the field risk tolerance is elicited through the 
following instruction: In this game, I offer a chance 
for you to choose one of the six lotteries displayed in 
the next image, which may allow you to earn from 0 
to 200 Birr depending on your choice of lottery and 
your luck. The total amount of reward you will get 
will depend on the outcome of the lottery you 
choose, which will depend on the outcome of a coin 
that I am going to flip.  Those who choose game (0) 
or (1) are categorized as extremely risk-averse, (2) or 
(3) are moderately risk-averse, and (4) or (5) are less 
risk-averse.                                                
1st round 
moderate  
risk-averse 
 
(A) 50 50 0.27 0.45 
55 
 
(B) 45 95 less risk-averse 
(C) 40 120 0.36 0.48 
(D) 30 150 
  
(E) 10 190 
  
(F) 0 200 
  
Monthly per capita household Income ('000ETB) 
Numeric Monthly per capita household income ('000ETB), 
including earnings and self-consumed value of 
self-employed and employed agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities, and non-labor earnings, 
such as remittances and governmental assistance.  
1st round 467.38 466.93 
TLU and its squared 
Numeric # of TLU owned at the timing of the baseline survey 
and its squared 
1st round 14.68 22.20 
Wealth index 
Numeric Wealth index computed by the principal component 
analysis from more than 30 assets, including durables 
and productive assets, household facilities. 
1st round -0.001 1.00 
Expected mortality rate 
Numeric Subjective expected mortality rate within a year 
elicited at the baseline survey  
1st round 48.27 28.39 
Expected livestock price (no change=1) dummy  
1 if a household expects the price of livestock to 
remain the same within a year from the baseline 
survey 
1st round 0.12 0.32 
Expected livestock price (increase=1) dummy  
1 if a household expects the price of livestock to rise 
within a year from the baseline survey 
1st round 0.57 0.50 
Cultivated Land (acre) Numeric Total cultivated area 1st round 1.42 2.08 
HH size 
Integer the number of household members at the timing of 
the baseline survey 
 
6.26 2.49 
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Head age and its squared 
Integer age of household head at the time of the baseline 
survey 
1st round 50.21 18.15 
Head male (=1) dummy  
1 if a household head is male at the time of the 
baseline survey 
1st round 0.79 0.41 
Head education Integer 
years of completed education of the household head 
at the time of the baseline survey 
1st round 0.50 1.83 
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Appendix 3. Second stage estimation results on demand for IBLI (Double Hurdle Model) with alternative definition of key variables 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Non-predicted value of # correct answer to quiz 
 
Self-reported value of % discount 
Sales period 1st   2nd 
 
1st   2nd 
Dependent variable 
Dummy to 
purchase 
IBLI 
Total 
insured herd 
value 
 
Dummy to 
purchase 
IBLI 
Total 
insured herd 
value 
 
Dummy to 
purchase 
IBLI 
Total 
insured 
herd value 
  
Dummy to 
purchase 
IBLI 
Total insured 
herd value 
                
 
    
# correct answer on IBLI quiz:  0.202*** 4.499** 
 
0.114*** 1.078 
 
-0.254** 26.059** 
 
0.108 33.767*** 
 
(0.043) (1.870) 
 
(0.042) (6.974) 
 
(0.107) (11.297) 
 
(0.130) (7.554) 
Period specific coupon recipient (=1) 0.216 -22.387 
 
0.228 -30.353 
 
1.269*** 14.816 
 
0.999*** -90.926*** 
 
(0.228) (24.891) 
 
(0.311) (69.161) 
 
(0.228) (35.805) 
 
(0.250) (24.686) 
Household- period specific premium rate  -0.126*** -15.039*** 
 
-0.185*** -18.690*** 
 
-0.069** -7.404* 
 
-0.001 -14.547*** 
 
(0.032) (3.528) 
 
(0.047) (4.011) 
 
(0.033) (4.093) 
 
(0.038) (2.800) 
Per capita household income ('000 ETB) -0.047 24.842*** 
 
0.117 13.616* 
 
-0.055 31.331 
 
0.168 52.783*** 
 
(0.159) (9.113) 
 
(0.153) (7.960) 
 
(0.154) (26.133) 
 
(0.154) (18.034) 
Proportion of income from livestock 0.009*** 0.122 
 
0.000 0.174 
 
0.006** 0.069 
 
0.000 -0.386 
 
(0.003) (0.150) 
 
(0.003) (0.201) 
 
(0.002) (0.571) 
 
(0.003) (0.352) 
Cultivated land (acre) 0.034 1.303 
 
-0.124*** -2.974 
 
0.034 2.768 
 
-0.135** -9.103*** 
 
(0.033) (1.021) 
 
(0.042) (2.080) 
 
(0.036) (4.350) 
 
(0.053) (2.876) 
TLU -0.013 0.149 
 
0.008 0.112 
 
-0.002 2.695 
 
0.007 -0.406 
 
(0.014) (0.276) 
 
(0.012) (0.342) 
 
(0.008) (2.218) 
 
(0.010) (0.865) 
TLU squared 0.000 -0.002 
 
0.000 -0.001 
 
0.000 -0.021 
 
0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.017) 
 
(0.000) (0.003) 
Wealth index 0.072* 1.891 
 
-0.066 9.549** 
 
0.075** 6.899 
 
-0.024 29.641*** 
 
(0.040) (1.283) 
 
(0.070) (4.256) 
 
(0.036) (7.135) 
 
(0.076) (9.798) 
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HH size -0.005 4.870* 
 
-0.000 -0.565 
 
-0.066*** 3.367 
 
0.010 5.078** 
 
(0.029) (2.554) 
 
(0.038) (1.261) 
 
(0.025) (5.664) 
 
(0.034) (2.557) 
Head age -0.011 2.598 
 
-0.024 0.638 
 
0.000 0.866 
 
-0.003 7.352** 
 
(0.021) (1.719) 
 
(0.031) (1.170) 
 
(0.021) (4.098) 
 
(0.028) (3.400) 
Head age squared 0.000 -0.025* 
 
0.000 -0.005 
 
-0.000 -0.012 
 
0.000 -0.053** 
 
(0.000) (0.014) 
 
(0.000) (0.009) 
 
(0.000) (0.036) 
 
(0.000) (0.026) 
Head male  (=1) -0.096 27.591** 
 
-0.334** 17.218* 
 
0.083 64.041 
 
-0.383** 95.749*** 
 
(0.168) (11.686) 
 
(0.155) (9.586) 
 
(0.184) (53.091) 
 
(0.192) (23.062) 
Head’ completed years of education -0.050 -8.440*** 
 
-0.127** -1.812 
 
-0.034 -8.456 
 
-0.060 3.557 
 
(0.033) (2.588) 
 
(0.063) (1.992) 
 
(0.039) (6.198) 
 
(0.070) (4.942) 
Expected mortality rate 0.000 -0.035 
 
0.001 -0.163 
 
0.000 -0.119 
 
0.002 -0.376 
 
(0.002) (0.099) 
 
(0.003) (0.163) 
 
(0.002) (0.262) 
 
(0.004) (0.267) 
Expected livestock price (unchange) (=1) a 0.054 13.061 
 
0.535* -0.101 
 
0.037 64.676 
 
0.610** 55.535** 
 
(0.244) (10.251) 
 
(0.282) (9.299) 
 
(0.226) (41.012) 
 
(0.279) (27.660) 
Expected livestock price (higher) (=1) a 0.172 -0.692 
 
0.072 26.916* 
 
0.094 8.417 
 
0.245 114.608*** 
 
(0.147) (8.013) 
 
(0.203) (14.446) 
 
(0.134) (32.230) 
 
(0.195) (41.931) 
Moderate risk averse (=1) b 0.017 -21.219** 
 
0.131 4.827 
 
-0.024 -83.594* 
 
0.049 1.338 
 
(0.193) (9.369) 
 
(0.193) (11.680) 
 
(0.172) (46.712) 
 
(0.186) (23.159) 
Less risk averse  (=1) b -0.022 -11.383 
 
-0.529*** -22.773* 
 
-0.136 -68.167 
 
-0.579*** -29.756 
 
(0.129) (10.104) 
 
(0.198) (13.697) 
 
(0.135) (42.352) 
 
(0.205) (24.690) 
Constant -1.246* -48.387 
 
-0.460 20.801 
 
0.293 -198.694 
 
-2.431** -382.218** 
  (0.731) (55.834)  (0.765) (120.337)   (0.711) (165.018)   (1.066) (179.028) 
Woreda dummies YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
 
YES YES 
Observations 474 474  474 474   474 474   474 474 
Note: Clustered standard errors at the study-site level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.001 
a The omitted category is that expected livestock price becomes lower. b The omitted category is extremely risk averse.  
